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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND MARINE CORPS

DEFINING THE PROBLEM
The United States Army and Marine Corps find themselves in conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States Army and Marine Corps have conducted a great debate over their mutual roles, responsibilities, and missions as America's and the world's most dominate land forces. Both forces compete for the same resources, and often the same missions, and unsurprisingly, at times developed an adversarial relationship. It is essential that their roles be integrated, defined for better cooperation, have complementary missions, and achieve synergy from the combined capabilities of each service. An uncoordinated effort threatens and undermines the U. S. National Security Strategy as well as potential costs on the future battlefield.
The entire question revolves around interoperability between the Army and Marine Corps to achieve optimal results. Certainly, after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, each service started in the right direction, but has the pace accelerated, decreased, or stopped? How truly interoperable are the Army and Marine Corps?
Interoperability consists of the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to operate effectively together.
1 Comparing the doctrine, organization, training, material, and leadership of each organization provides the backdrop for observations and comparison.
Doctrine will include appropriate United States Code Title 10 directives and responsibilities, Department of Defense directives, and service doctrine for comparison. Organization, training and operations of each service will highlight how each service has operated in specific "joint" operations and how training has affected operational performance. The material aspect of each service that will be compared includes the acquisition, transformation, and interoperability of both services. Lastly, the leadership aspect of both services includes joint oversight, visions of the services, and leader training. In conclusion, critical joint service issues will be highlighted that affect future operations and discussion for improved effectiveness and application.
VIGNETTE
Two Commanders are given a mission to begin the offense. They are assigned parallel zones of operation adjacent to each other. The first Commander turns to his baseline doctrinal manual for operations in the offense. Opening his doctrinal manual, he reviews the appropriate reference and finds the different options for him by types of offensive operations. For the offense, the types prescribed are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. 2 He can use several forms of maneuver to include, envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, and frontal attack. 3 The second commander does the same and reviews his organizational doctrine for the offense. When reviewing his doctrine, the second Commander finds his options for types of offensive operations include movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. 4 He now checks the forms of maneuver available to him and reviews the envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, frontal attack, and flanking attack.
Each doctrine identifies relatively similar options, but with different forms of maneuver and are described by different authors with different interpretations and nuances based on their respective experience, style, and approval by their organizational leadership. Differences as subtle as the direction of the envelopment as in Figures 1 and 2 from the opposite directions 
DOCTRINE AND DIRECTIVES
THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS MISSIONS
The Army Mission is taken directly from Title 10 directives. Expanding on this mission in Army Field Manual 1, The Army, the purpose of the Army is to fight and win our Nation's wars.
14
The unique contribution to national security is prompt, sustained, land dominance across the range of military operations and the spectrum of conflict. Further defined in the manual are the Army core competencies of shaping the security environment, prompt response, mobilize the Army, forcible entry operations, sustained land dominance, and support to civil authorities. is that since its creation many of the issues that the JROC was designed to address, such as roles and missions, force structure, and resource distribution among the services has been largely avoided. 33 As a result, the requirement for consensus in the JROC has produced an agenda that focused on smaller issues that were more palatable for service Vice Chiefs of Staff.
Services have structured their staffs to prepare JROC issues. Additionally, another layer in the process has been added, known as the JROC Review Board (JRB). The JRB was added and designed to provide a structured process of service two star level oversight similar to the JROC for shaping the agenda and proposals prior to presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 34 The result of this combined layering, service interests, and requirement for consensus was that major issues were withdrawn, reconsidered, or never presented to the JROC. The most telling revelation of the diffusion of the process of potential contentious issues is that one JROC official acknowledged that he could recall no instance where the JROC failed to approve a requirement or support a system that a service wanted. 
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